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This paper explores the situated body by briefly surveying the historical studies of effect and of 
affect which converge in current work on attention. This common approach to the situated body 
through attention prompted the coining of a more inclusive term, Æffect, to indicate the situated 
body’s mode of observation. Examples from the work of artist-turned-architects, Arakawa and 
Gins, will be discussed to show how architectural environments can act as heuristic tools that 
allow the situated body to research its own conditions. Rather than isolating effect from affect, 
observer from subject, organism from environment, Arakawa and Gins’ work optimises the use 
of situated complexity in the study of the site of person. By constructing surrounding in which 
to observe and learn about the shape of awareness, their procedural architecture suggests ways in 
which the interaction of top-down conceptual knowledge and bottom-up perceptual learning may construct 
possibilities in emergent rather than programmatic ways. 
In order to render the situated body an adequate value for studies of the 
body, it is crucial to examine the way situatedness is observed and measured 
by diverse research approaches within and across the arts and sciences. This 
paper discusses the historical context that has led to the emergence of studies 
of effect and affect, and offers an approach for an expanded measure, Æffect, 
which attempts to heighten the relation between top-down conceptual pro-
Figure 1. The architectural body of Arakawa 
and Gins
cessing and bottom-up perceptual 
learning. A more inclusive field of 
measure becomes useful when sur-
veying current discourse on attention 
and the far-reaching implications of 
the written and built works of art-
ists-turned-architects Arakawa and 
Gins, which posit an architectural 
body that reconfigures the identity 
boundaries of the organism-person-
surround through a ‘procedural 
architecture’. 
By combining the logic of sense 
with the logic of sensation, it is pos-
sible to consider the methodologies 
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of diverse research cultures as bodily practices and make inclusive readings 
of situated bodies. Arakawa and Gins not only accept this premise, but have 
been conducting collaborative research for 35 years on the convergent yet 
irreducible specificities and mechanisms of ‘sited awareness’. Refusing the 
conceptual boundaries between affect and effect and observing the bioto-
pological boundaries between organism-person-surround, they propose 
to change an ‘organism that persons’ into an ‘architectural body’ (Gins & 
Arakawa 2) 
One of the first considerations to be addressed in order to facilitate a 
convergence of research activities is the (perceived) appropriation, or even 
theft, of scientific concepts by the arts and humanities. Only by rethinking 
the concept of measure can the one-way traffic of ideas from science to 
the arts become a two-way mutual exchange. Brian Massumi observes in 
Parables for the Virtual that, after concepts have been transplanted—for 
example, from the sciences to the arts—what remains is their connectability 
(Massumi 20). This begins to indicate the entirely different registers within 
which the two cultures approach concept and facticity, which frustrates many 
collaborative projects that cannot bridge the methodological divide. Whereas 
the conceptual separation of measures (represented by affect and effect) 
may be useful for the identification of an object of study by producing an 
observable value, it is detrimental to research that would coordinate modes 
of accumulating and constructing knowledge.
In their work, Arakawa and Gins coordinate diverse research across the 
sciences and between the arts and sciences in an effort to study consciousness 
and cognition as situated and distributed. For example, philosopher Ralph 
Ellis (xviii) suggests that the relationship of phenomenological experiencing 
of affect should be correlated with biological processes, bringing together 
strands of self-organisation and biochemistry with philosophy, psychology 
and neuroscience. Psychotherapist Eugene Gendlin proposes a first-person 
science akin to ecology and the study of complex processes that interconnects 
a science of subjective experiences with third-person science. Arakawa 
and Gins’ collaborative work represents ‘state of the art’ transdisciplinary 
research that utilizes body-wide practices to explore perception, action and 
connectability. They suggest that disciplinary boundaries are not appropriate 
for or consistent with the dynamic lived-experience of interaction across the 
organism-person-surround:
Research should no longer be done off to one side, in a school, a 
library or laboratory. Where one lives needs to become a laboratory 
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for researching, for mapping directly, the living body itself, oneself as 
a world-forming inhabitant. (Gins & Arakawa xxi)
Arakawa and Gins practice what Basarab Nicolescu describes as the 
distinguishing feature of transdisciplinarity, which ‘concerns the dynamics 
engendered by the action of several levels of Reality at once’, in contrast 
to disciplinary research which is concerned with one and the same level of 
Reality. Transdisciplinarity attempts to overcome irreconcilable differences 
of discourse by applying the logic of one theory or system of measure to the 
elaboration of another without reducing one to the other. In his essay on 
Arakawa and Gins, Hideo Kawamoto recalls Neils Bohr’s famous declaration 
regarding the indeterminability of reality (Kawamoto 85). Bohr’s argument 
is that all facts and phenomena become reduced under the logical possibility 
that another reality exists. Consciousness proceeds through this process 
of reduction. Therefore, in principle, once a phenomenological reduction 
has been performed, reality has been excluded (Kawamoto 85). Arakawa 
and Gins take issue with the supposition that consciousness cannot be 
practised in any other way than through reduction. The study of affect and 
effect intersect when the arts and sciences turn their focus on attention, 
perception and action. It is also at this juncture (the study of attention) that 
Arakawa and Gins’ research on ‘landing sites’ examines the way in which a 
person produces sited awareness and begins to understand him or herself as 
‘the mechanism of meaning’ in order to reconfigure the relationships across 
the organism-person-surround through the invention of architectural 
procedures. The important thing to note is their emphasis on the necessity 
of working across different material processes to avoid over-determining a 
configuration of sensing or scale of action through habit or ritual. To this 
end, their research on the extent of the site of person concerns the ongoing 
co-construction of the ‘shape of awareness’ (Gins & Arakawa 86). They 
contend that the questions themselves must be built in order to explore the 
extent of the body. Constructing ‘tactically posed surrounds’ in tandem with 
discursive sequences makes perceiving perceptible to the resident-researcher. 
Their project has attracted interest from governments, sponsorship 
from major corporations and the participation of leading researchers in 
cognitive science, neuroscience, cognitive linguistics, consciousness studies 
and ecological psychology. Their previous collaborations include books, 
installations, films, houses, large-scale earthworks, small communities, and 
plans for housing developments and cities.
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Effect as opposed to Affect
The history of the emergence of conflicting values generated by a 
different research focus can be traced in relatively recent times to the 
classroom of William James, whose ‘radical empiricism’ represented a 
moment of convergence before his students took divergent paths. The 
arts lineage, concerned with producing and observing affect, can be traced 
through his student, Gertrude Stein,1 while the other line, concerned with 
observing quantifiable effects, runs through E.B. Holt2 and the philosophical 
behaviorism of the new realists (Heft 59). 
This moment in history influences our current relationship with our 
own modes of attention and the specific context of attention. The key to 
establishing any sense measure that might accommodate conflicting values 
may be mapped in the discourse on attention, a history parallel to the story 
of ill-will between effect and affect. Montague, one of the new realists of 
1912, outlined an ecological perspective that Holt handed on to James J. 
Gibson. In the ecological perspective outlined by Montague, “things are not 
dependent upon the fact that anybody experiences it” (Heft 73). In other 
words, the world is not for humans alone. It is within this context that the 
neutrality of attention was formulated. Both James and Holt considered that 
the knower’s perception intersects with the manifold of the environment 
at the experience, which belongs to the realm of objects in the world. This 
was to be accentuated in Gibson’s search for an immediate and unmediated 
direct perception.
The different tendencies developed by Stein and Holt from radical 
empiricism underpin the debates that re-emerged on the pages of Leonardo 
magazine between James J. Gibson and art historian E.H. Gombrich during 
the 1970s. Though the debates centered on Gibson’s picture theory, the stakes 
were characterized by the difference between theories based upon direct 
perception and those that include indirect perception. Gibson’s notions of 
direct perception and ‘affordances’3—the perceived utility of objects—were 
confronted by Gombrich’s (1971) suggestion that people can attend to 
imaginary objects. Ultimately, the contention for Gombrich, as well as for 
artists today, has to do with different scales of Gibson’s affordance—for 
example, whether the object in an environment holds certain perceivable 
potential or whether the context itself can be perceived to hold different 
potentials, and where each potential exhibits a new range of affordances. 
Shifts in scale bring new levels of abstraction into play. This complication 
opens the discussion to the movement of attention across direct and indirect 
consequences. 
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For Gibson, perception is attention—more precisely, attention tied 
directly to available information in the environment. Gombrich (14) 
notes that “perception in this sense is inseparable from what Gibson calls 
proprioception.” He challenges the notion of affordances by suggesting 
that we also perceive potential usefulness. The linking of affordance with 
foreseeable consequences, on the other hand, keeps imagination and its 
relation to memory at bay. Gombrich (15) repeats Gibson’s insistence that 
perception should not be confused with imagination, hallucination or 
dreaming. Not only is this at the heart of the Gibson and Gombrich debate, 
it points to wider contention as to whether we can and do attend to our 
imagination, our illusions, attunements in dreams and therefore in works of 
art, literature and architecture (Gombrich 15). Arakawa and Gins propose 
that perception, to a great extent, is imagination. For artists, the different 
modes of perception and attention, direct and indirect, do not cancel each 
other out because we have learned how to switch between these two modes 
pragmatically, as specific situations require. 
Arakawa and Gins’ approach is consistent with findings on the 
deployment of attention as a selective mechanism and as a process of resource 
allocation. Further, I suggest that attention is the mechanism that connects 
automatic functions to deliberate activity through feedback and deliberate 
re-entry into modalities of sensing. Although Arakawa and Gins clearly 
see more potential for auto-affection through the practice of fine-grained 
spatial and temporal character of attention and involuntary processing, 
the inconclusiveness of scientific findings does not deter scientists and 
artists from practising self-devised systems of attention, which mostly go 
unrecorded.
We are encouraged to take sides and ‘take possession of reality’ through a 
‘war on totality’ that is the result of a histo-chronic melancholy (Lyotard 1988, 
82; 1993, 16). War on totality would favor diversity and incommensurable 
difference. Naomi Klein has observed the opposite tendency in what she 
calls ‘the war on diversity’, a result of “neo-liberal economics biased at every 
level towards centralisation, consolidation, homogenisation” (Klein 245). 
Rather than characterizing the social, political and figural tendencies as 
virulent bureaucratic entrenchments in the administration of being, I would 
argue for the re-singularization of engagement at the level of embodied 
cognition. The war on totality must be fought particularly on the front of 
the ‘always already’ most evident in the teleological finality inherent in the 
conceptualization of human systems. It invades language through ‘systems 
theory’, closing down the possibility of emergence, whether through the 
logic of genetics or grammatology or a collective imaginary, by positing a 
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limit so definitive as to foreclose on anything but repetition. Repetition and 
inescapable mimesis in turn become the reasons for a war on totality because 
what the systems of production extrude is endless sameness, marketed 
as variety. The ‘always already’ is a terrible force of social construction, 
unrelenting and impenetrable because it is located in ‘the body’ of our bodies, 
in the dictionary of our utterances, in the clothes of our socialization and 
the progress of our scientific model of the universe.
If it is possible to turn ‘oppositions back into differences’ (Bennington 
75), the first step is to recognize that opposition of affect and effect does 
not constitute a duality, a doubling or two sides of the same coin. In fact, 
the seeming opposition may represent distinct configurations of cognitive 
processing taking shape on different scales of action. A conflation results 
from over-investment in systems that address only one scale or one mode 
of sensing. The resulting domains of knowledge would therefore represent 
blind spots in the sense of the world rather than comprehensive methods 
of inquiry. Typically, as Foucault noticed in his essay on ‘Las Meninas’, the 
site that goes unnoticed (doubly invisible) is not only under our noses and 
outside the space of representation, but is the body connected to the nose 
at the very site of the perceiving (Foucault 4).
Æffect
Arakawa and Gins have both abandoned their individual arts prac-
tices of painting and poetry to devote their efforts to observation, learning 
and transformation of the extent of the site of the body. They no longer 
call their work art or architecture, and struggle to name the process that 
is concerned with making “readily available a reference guide to all that a 
person can possibly rally to the cause of being a person” (Arakawa & Gins 
1997, epigram). 
Therefore, to signal an embodied approach that moves towards an 
expanded field of experience, which can no longer be sensed through the 
conceptual filters of affect or effect, I have coined the term Æffect. This 
must operate as a disposition towards inclusion rather than as a reductive 
single scale of measure. Æffect refers to what can be registered by a system 
of measure rather than the measure that constrains what counts as sensation 
or experience. Ultimately, this multi-modal approach indicates the con-
tinuous interactions performed upon the systems of affective and effective 
measures, reapplied to events and things. Such a fine-grained self-reflexive 
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awareness will help us to determine what it is that we observe when we 
observe value. 
Arakawa and Gins’ procedural architecture widens the range of speci-
ficities, which has the benefit of keeping a person’s attention tied to events 
within and outside of him or herself, thereby avoiding the spiral of in-turning 
awareness. Neurons send and receive information concerning the relationship 
of internal descriptions to external descriptions while inter-neurons send and 
receive information regarding internal descriptions of internal descriptions. 
Recursive feedback pertains to growth of self-awareness in the same way 
that neural ‘centers’ grow as the feedback from specific activities, such as 
playing the piano, increases. The presence and fluctuation of inter-neurons 
or ‘interoceptive feedback’ (Faw 59) imply that awareness of one’s own 
perception is an activity that produces overall cognitive change, reflected in 
psycho-physiological growth. In other words, awareness of one’s own bodily 
states increases the ways in which a person can directly affect his or her own 
body-wide cognition and “participate in morphological development of the 
brain” (Backhaus 225).
Disentangling effects from affects impacts on top-down processing 
and the subsequent totalized concepts, images and plans it produces. The 
separation is implemented in the conceptual map and image of bodily activity 
that plays a role in the way a person may enter into the embodied practice of 
producing feedback loops (recursive neuronal activity that involves sensation, 
emotion and abstract thought). Science is able to supply transcripts of 
self-organizing systems in action—for example, by charting how conscious 
emotions act as a catalyst for coordinated organismic behaviours (Newton 
98), but science is unable to find “an information state which stands to 
internal states as internal states stand to states in the world” (Evans in 
Newton 101). Arakawa and Gins propose that this ‘information state’ is 
elusive because it is not a state; rather, it is a site configured and tentatively, 
but continuously, landed upon by distributed embodied cognition. 
As a result, I have designed the term ‘Æffect’ (and its extrapolations, 
Æffection, Æffective and Æffectivity) to constantly evoke our bodily 
experience as a mild irritant due to its awkward physicality (in pronouncing 
the diphthong). This slight physical impediment in the form of a word 
produces a moment of hesitation when the embodied acts of reading 
and comprehension intersect within the conventionally unbroken and 
transparent flow of discourse. 
Using the diphthong Æ ensures that Æffect’s pronunciation receives 
embodied attention. This attention lies in the eye’s stumbling over the archaic 
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contraction Æ, appropriated from obscure and unused terms; the eye–mouth 
coordination stuttering in uncertainty as to the pronunciation; the ear’s 
straining to differentiate the modulation of the single breath shift from A 
to E. (Æsthetics has separated into aesthetics or esthetics, pronounced by 
choosing a short form of a or e respectively.) All of these subtle attentions 
compound and are consistent with the embodied situation that the word 
Æffect indicates. Finally, and most importantly, Æffect signals an enunciative 
and embodied orientation to methodology, particularly in regard to the 
construction and practice of any systematized, consistently motivated set 
of links, concepts, topics, discursive formations, intertextual resonances and 
inter-implicated interpretive readings. I have decided to write Æ large so 
that it remains large in the mouth, large to the eye and large in its placement 
within thought.
The coinage of a new term is one aspect that will contribute to enacting 
a shift to body-wide awareness that Arakawa and Gins’ work invites us to 
practice. This strategy enables a person to insert his or her methodological 
orientation into the text as an index, to disrupt these various certainties, 
occlusions and omissions by returning us, as outlined earlier, to embodied 
attention. It is by way of the body and its existential insistence in the 
production of concepts that we can actively forget the hold that language 
has on cognition by ‘making language stutter’, as Deleuze famously stated 
(Deleuze & Guattari 98). In “He Stuttered,” Deleuze observes that 
if the system appears to be in perpetual disequilibrium, if the system 
bifurcates—and has terms each of which traverses a zone of continuous 
variation—language itself will begin to vibrate and to stutter, and will 
not be confused with speech, which always assumes only one variable 
position among others and follows only one direction’ (Deleuze 1994, 
24). We need to remember here that ‘bifurcations’ produce not a series 
of neat binaries but a stuttering rhizomatic formation — ‘A new form 
of redundancy. AND … AND … AND. (Deleuze & Guattari 98)
Arakawa and Gins also make use of disequilibrium by applying it to 
the processes of perception and action. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari make 
language stutter, Arakawa and Gins make the habitual body bifurcate, which 
allows multiple lines of embodied action to emerge. This way of indicating 
the irrepressible becoming of bodies is evident in Arakawa and Gins’ 1990 
collaboration with architect Johannes Knesl on an installation entitled 
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Stuttering God. In this work, the same strategy is used to counteract the 
teleological finality inherent in language and thus begin to evoke a ‘reversible 
destiny’ (Knesl 215). For Deleuze and Knesl, and for Arakawa and Gins, 
it is the body that enunciates its multimodality (configurability) through 
stuttering. The tentativeness of situated yet non-prefigured connections 
inevitably interrupts the seamlessness and ‘always-already’ of language. 
Smooth discourse only occurs when one already knows what one will say 
or allows language to say it. Stuttering is the result of tentative and ongoing 
configuration micro-events that result in unanticipated differentiation. 
Although Deleuze concludes that stuttering, which brings language to 
its limit, also delivers it to silence (1994, 28), Arakawa and Gins find 
that a stuttering, disequiliberated body brings the ‘organism that persons’ 
enunciative enactments, which they call ‘forming blank’ (Arakawa & Gins 
1987, 10).
In order to reclaim the blank as the reservoir of possibility, we need 
to make the body, language, discourse and method stutter to reveal the 
link between meaning and biotopology, reconnecting perceptual learning, 
as body-environment literacy, to discursive and linguistically oriented 
epistemology. More inclusive modes of perceptual learning ultimately 
delimit and deregulate the practice of embodied cognition. To that end, 
the conditions of embodied cognition must be investigated from many 
points to carve out how ‘never being outside discourse’ can shift to include 
a-signifying dimensions. 
Correlating Attention
If we now apply Æffect to the research practices and discourse on atten-
tion, a more pervasive and sensitive seismic field appears by which to measure 
situated configurations of sensing within and across identity boundaries that 
can no longer adequately account for the world. As the following series of 
discussions will show, there are rumblings from diverse areas regarding the 
need for the deregulation of disciplinary measures; however, Arakawa and 
Gins are the only ones to both study and enact their research in a situated 
realization of living.
Art theorist Jonathan Crary, in Suspensions of Perception, comments that 
“attention, as a series of texts and practices, is much more than a question 
of the gaze, of looking, of the subject as spectator.” Too often, the visual has 
been studied solely as an effect of power relations. In an attempt to keep 
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attention from being hijacked in any one direction, Crary discusses vision 
as “only one layer of a body that could be captured, shaped and controlled 
by a range of external techniques; at the same time vision is one part of a 
body capable of evading institutional capture and of inventing new forms, 
affects and intensities” (Crary 3). He goes on to add that the mixed modali-
ties of perception have received little or no analysis in visual studies, and 
links the idea of specific historical models of behavior to bodily activity such 
as vision, perception and attention. It is not the history of the historical 
model that is important here, but the suggestion that, in various historical 
periods, multimodality is directed differently and configures attention and 
perception in organism-environments.
Philosopher of science Gary Hatfield tracks the trajectory of research 
on attention, indicating the variegated phenomenological descriptions 
which include narrowing, active directing, clarity, fixation over time, effec-
tor sensitivity and motivational aspects. He adds involuntary shifts to the 
list, which are not a phenomenological category. As he moves through the 
litany of descriptions that weld attention to intention and deliberate self-
affecting action, it is the inclusion of involuntary shifts that is most illumi-
nating. Hatfield cites Augustine on the tendency for attention to be drawn 
involuntarily to objects of sensory pleasure and cognitive interest (Hatfield 
8). He does not develop this idea in his survey—unlike arts practitioners, 
also influenced by Augustine, who have explored ways that a person may 
deliberately provoke involuntary responses. Children know this game well, 
and post-structuralists raised this strategy under the banner of ‘play’ to the 
critical engagement called deconstruction. In the context of arts practice, 
artworks may be regarded as situations that make involuntary functions 
visible. Arakawa and Gins, in their procedural architecture, concur with 
Hatfield’s assessment of contemporary research on attention and deploy it 
as a selective mechanism and process of resource allocation. Further, I would 
suggest that attention is the mechanism that connects automatic functions 
to deliberate activity. To a great extent, contemporary art is precisely the 
expression of individual Æffective attentional systems.
One of the more problematic and persistent issues regarding attention 
is whether there can be attention without perception, or whether we must 
have a precept for attention to occur. Cognitive scientists Arien Mack and 
Irvin Rock conducted a study of perception under conditions of inattention. 
They were working under the assumption that something had to be perceived 
without attention (Mack & Rock 55). They discovered a phenomenon 
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which they named Inattentional Blindness, or IB. Their experiment was 
structured to observe the situations in which a test subject perceived a critical 
stimulus. They discovered that, if the critical stimulus in their experiment 
was presented at fixation point and an experimental object (for example, a 
cross) was centered in a peripheral location previously occupied by the critical 
stimulus, then the IB of the critical stimulus dramatically increased. Mack 
and Rock had anticipated the opposite. They thought that transposing the 
critical stimulus to the fixation point would eliminate IB, and indicate that 
the inability to detect the critical stimulus was a function of inattention 
(Mack & Rock 63). They observed that “subjects may tacitly learn to inhibit 
attention from particular spatial locations which then leads to a significant 
increase in IB” (64). This suggests that, when measuring for effect, you can-
not separate out affect—especially attention to content and context. Mack 
and Rock concluded that attention provides the key that unlocks the gate 
dividing unconscious perception from conscious perception. Without this 
attentional key, there is simply no awareness of the stimulus (71). 
Some theories of attention suggest that attention comes after perception 
of the whole (which allows an object to be attended). However, wholeness 
understood in this way is susceptible to habit and therefore to conceptual, 
imaginary and ideological influence. If, as Mack and Rock suggest, attention 
can unlock the divide between unconscious and conscious attention, it may 
also unlock the divide between effect and affect tendencies in perceptual 
valuation. 
In Consciousness and the World, philosopher of science Brian 
O’Shaughnessy undertakes an analytical inquiry into consciousness and its 
close ties to perception. He brings together many strands of contemporary 
scientific and philosophical inquiry, but ultimately concurs with ecological 
principles—the search for how the (embodied) mind opens out on to 
its environment. In the concluding pages, he makes observations that 
resonate with Arakawa and Gins’ ‘procedures’ published in the same year 
in Architectural Body. In a discussion of the seeming self-sufficiency of 
visual experience, O’Shaughnessy comments that vision and touch are what 
instruct us: 
It is not just that they underscore the situatedness of perception: they 
bring to light a further dimension of this phenomenon, concealed by the 
highly interpretational visual accomplishments of the instant. Namely, 
the existence of something one could call the perceptual constituting 
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of the material object out of situated momentary experiences … 
(O’Shaughnessy 693) 
O’Shaughnessy’s description comes very close to one of Arakawa and Gins’ 
procedures: “tentative constructing towards a holding in place” (Gins & 
Arakawa 49). This procedure is the result of layered awareness called ‘landing 
sites’ which designate “anything whatsoever, including even the most fleeting 
sensations … a neural marker, a simple taking note of, nothing more” (Gins 
& Arakawa 6). Arakawa and Gins state: 
The body is sited. As that which initiates pointing, selecting, electing, 
determining and considering, it may be said to originate (read co-
originate) all sites. Organism-person-environment consists of sites and 
would-be sites. An organism-person, a sited body, lives as one site that 
is composed of many sites. (5) 
From here, “the world one finds in place lends itself to being mapped 
by means of a multiple, complex siting process or procedure” (Gins & 
Arakawa 7). Their notion of landing sites integrates detection, projection 
and imagination in a world undergoing constant transformation.
The relation of landing sites to the body is consistent with 
O’Shaughnessy’s connection of the purposes of attention in consciousness. 
At the beginning of his chapter on attention, he comments that attention 
has been “insufficiently studied by philosophers” (275). His discussion of 
the non-cognitive function of attention parallels Arakawa and Gins’ notion 
of ‘landing’ as a neutral marker. They also ask: “if persons are sited, why do 
philosophers inquiring into what constitutes a person or, for that matter, 
into the nature of mind, rarely, if ever, factor this in?” (Gins & Arakawa 5) 
Here, philosophers take the blame because they have staked claim on both 
knowledge and how it is produced.4
Attention, as an aspect of affect that must use effective physiological 
systems with an anatomical basis, is also an undervalued and neglected area 
of study by artists and serves as the most obvious common point of interest 
for scientists, philosophers and artists. O’Shaughnessy observes that the 
special character of perceptual imagining allows us to unravel the “measure of 
dependence of one psychological phenomenon upon another. For example, 
intention guarantees the identity of act-intentions but imagining fails to 
guarantee identity for visual imaginings” (O’Shaughnessy 271). 
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Arakawa and Gins’ version of attention breaks it into three ways to 
land as a site: imaging, perceptual and dimensionalizing landing sites (Gins 
& Arakawa 5–22). Perceptual landing sites are immediate and direct, while 
imaging landing sites may be said to fill in the gaps between perceptual 
landing sites. Because imaging landing sites are involved in forming the way 
we perceive and therefore construct the world, it cannot be said that they 
use the world to fill in what is missing from it, but use prior knowledge 
combined with untested approximations to ‘land upon’ sites in the world 
that cannot be perceived directly. Dimensionalizing landing sites combine 
the previous two, “coupling and coordinating direct responses with indirect 
ones, the formed with the formless” (Gins and Arakawa 7, 8).
While O’Shaughnessy and Arakawa and Gins appear to concur on 
many points, they present their research on the body and consciousness from 
two very different discursive positions, corresponding to measures valuing 
effect and affect respectively. O’Shaughnessy’s text is analytical, filled with 
formulae and comprehensive in its survey of current medical and scientific 
research as well as philosophical discussion. He interprets and extrapolates 
the philosophical implications of the ideas and findings he surveys to 
produce an effective argument. In contrast, Arakawa and Gins put forward 
no formulae, only obliquely reference current information, and produce an 
affective argument that purposely leaves behind a tyrannical and oppressive 
set of disciplinary histories. Their affective engagement is not an emotional 
plea, but a reasoned and rigorous petition for attentiveness. In keeping with 
Figure 2. Computer model of Bioscleave House, 
East Hampton, LI, USA (begun in 1998) 
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their poetic and artistic backgrounds, they avoid the legitimation game by 
cultivating suspicions of the architecture of knowledge that permeates our 
habits, bodies and surroundings. Configurations of landing sites operate 
tentatively and provisionally because they are perceptual tools designed to 
help a person avoid generalizations and prefabricated categories of site and 
experience. 
There are many examples of Arakawa and Gins’ use of existing 
experimental structures from psychology and recontextualisation strategies 
from the arts which are aimed at exploring body-wide reconfigurations of 
attention. These yield insight into the way function can be transformed into 
procedure. Arakawa and Gins utilize the famous Ames room in Bioscleave 
House (currently under construction in East Hampton, Long Island, New 
York). 
In addition to providing data about subjects from a third-person 
vantage point, experiments such as the ‘visual cliff’ or the ‘swinging room 
device’5 can be put to procedural architectural use directed towards and taken 
up from a researcher-practitioner’s first-person vantage point. The visual cliff 
informs a researcher about continuity of perception and the acquisition of a 
perceptual schema that operates across occluded objects. The swinging room 
device also indicates the connection of attention to perception. Arakawa 
and Gins have not directly appropriated these experimental structures. 
Instead, through tactically posed surrounds, Arakawa and Gins make 
these problems of perception directly apparent to the experimental subject 
(resident researcher). This is the difference between scientific research that 
benefits other parties, commercial research that amplifies the way bodies 
deal with incoherence for our own amusement, and Arakawa and Gins’ 
research, which enables persons to perceive the way surrounds literally shape 
the physiology of attention.
The idea of including experimental structure in residences aims to 
break with conventions of observer and subject. The awareness and research 
findings these structures produce are not for the benefit of an observer—the 
psychologist, external to the site—but are for the researchers-in-residence 
who are the beneficiaries of the findings that question existing subject/
object/environment relationships. It is these individuals who become aware 
of themselves as ‘the mechanism of meaning’. ‘Scientific’ experimental 
structures are functional with respect to data collection; however, they do 
not make us aware of how we construct these perceptions, nor do they 
require that we question the mode of perception by which we assess the 
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situation. If the scientific observer can no longer be quarantined from the 
phenomenological observer, the notions of research, and practice as research, 
would combine approaches to study the complex interactions coordinated 
by embodied cognition. I will examine one architectural example from 
Arakawa and Gins in more detail.
Arakawa and Gins’ Bioscleave House tactically repositions the 
psychological experiment called the Ames room, which is the model for the 
main and central room of the house. The Ames room construction makes 
shallow space appear deep, confounding the perception of distance by which 
to judge the height of a person in the space (Figure 3). Arakawa and Gins use 
the Ames room for heuristic application, prioritising the bodily coordination 
of sensing it produces over the inattention it highlights. 
The Ames room is constructed to be viewed from a single view point 
external to the room. It ‘works’ because the room offers false information 
and not enough information to judge distance and therefore size. The second 
photo (Figure 4) taken in front of a simple backdrop, shows that the ‘illusion’ 
can be reduced to manipulation of a single element: the floor. If the ability to 
use the floor as a perceptual measure is subtracted, the ability to judge object 
relationships diminishes and generalisations are used instead. For psychology, 
the false perspective aids in the study of the relation of prior knowledge, 
precepts and expectations to the act of perception. The Ames room is 
functional with respect to data collection, just as the Frank Lloyd Wright 
house (attached to Bioscleave House) is functional in terms of amplifying the 
inter-penetration of interior and exterior space. Neither makes us aware of 
how we construct these perceptions, nor do they require we question the 
mode of perception by which we assess the situation. The inclusion of the 
structure of the Ames room in Bioscleave House is of another heuristic order. 
In this tactical surround, the awareness and research findings are not for the 
Figure 3. Ames room reconstruction
benefit of the observer, but for the 
researcher-in-residence who is the 
beneficiary of the findings.
It is important to note that 
Arakawa and Gins have inverted 
the Ames room ‘effect’. Instead of 
collapsing the perspective of the 
room, they have exaggerated it, 
making the room appear very deep. 
Although these photos do not show 
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the finished floor, which will be an undulating terrain of rammed earth, 
Arakawa and Gins have used the floor as part of the perceptual challenge; 
however, instead of eliminating the perspective cues afforded by the floor, 
they have constructed Bioscleave so that no horizon steadies the floor by 
locking the mounds into a stabilising visual cue. Even though the final 
earth floor was not in place during my visit, it was still possible to read the 
undulation of the floor’s design in the skeleton concrete floor. 
The perceptually ambiguous rammed earth floor, combined with 
the placement of the windows very high and very low, does not permit a 
resident in this central room to establish a relationship to the horizon. There 
Figure 4. Ames room effect (photo by visual 
psychologist Richard Gregory)
Figure 5. Bioscleave House interior view of 
central room.
is no vantage point from which to 
see the interior floor in relation to 
the exterior ground. The windows 
visible in the photos are semi-
transparent, allowing light but no 
exterior view. The windows diffuse 
the light, even making it difficult to 
perceive the direction of the light 
for orientation. The Æffect of this is 
dramatic, and is accentuated when 
walking around the sunken kitchen 
and dining area, where the ability to 
determine levels is never reinforced 
by corresponding to the walls, 
ceiling or other features (see Figure 
2). The absence of a fixed measure 
results in an initial unbalance and 
disorientation followed by the 
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finding of other modes of balance — for example, event-based proprioception 
rather than structure-based cues. Disjunction of the visual (instead of 
completion of an illusion) means a person establishes connections to the 
architecture momentarily rather than in ways programmed by the history 
of architecture.
The interaction of the floor and the ceiling are reminiscent, for me, of the 
way Arakawa and Gins’ multi-level labyrinths operate on different portions 
and apportionments of the body in the surround. In Critical Resemblances 
House, the separate labyrinths were positioned at different levels of the body, 
requiring a person to separate and join (cleave) new configurations of landing 
sites. This occurs in Bioscleave House because of the omission of a fixed visual 
horizon so that the resident must use vision to orient the top portion of the 
body and proprioception to orient the lower portion. It is the coordination 
of these apportionments that perceptual learning provides, and which reason 
and rule of judgment cannot. The labyrinth6 allows an ‘organism that persons’ 
to become aware of both the separate articulation of parts and the connection 
and connectivity of parts through acts of sited awareness. Arakawa and Gins 
refer to the enactive relationship produced by tactically built surrounds 
engaged with body-wide awareness as critical resemblances (Arakawa & Gins 
1994, 258–59) and critical holders (Gins & Arakawa 81). It is ‘critical’ because 
these material processes allow a person to compare and contrast the way 
they disperse perceptual values and meaningful consequences by experiencing 
Figure 6. Critical Resemblances House with multi-level 
labyrinth
diverse physical orientations 
to repeated architectural 
features. Thereby, sameness 
(resemblances) opens itself 
to difference and the 
production of more landing 
sites, increased awareness 
and a reconfiguration 
o f  o b j e c t – s u b j e c t 
relationships.
F o r  r e s e a r c h e r -
practitioners who would 
be emerging ‘architectural 
bodies’, this is an opportunity 
to make observations across 
the effect/affect divide. 
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New forms of observation require new forms of attention. The construct 
of ‘person’ straddles the organism and the environment, allowing directed 
attention to re-enter the large-scale process of selection. The ‘person as 
artist’ is one kind of historical structure that negotiates between organism 
and environment. The ‘objective researcher’ as observer is another. Neither 
configuration alone is adequate to conduct and inquiry into the situated 
body. The ‘architectural body’ of Arakawa and Gins and reimagined fields 
of measure such as Æffect make new forms of person imaginable that are 
neither artist or scientist. Persons no longer need to be obedient to the 
rule that form follows function, especially the function of being a ‘person’. 
Function extends and amplifies the senses, while procedures increase the 
observation of functional sensing to enable exploration of the movement 
within and between modes of sensing (Gins & Arakawa 58).
By perceiving body-wide attentional processes of selection, we may 
move from natural selection to a meta-cultural process of selection, inter-
vening in deliberate ways that optimize the full complexity of situatedness. 
Arakawa and Gins have tied the future of the human species to a process 
of daily research that configures scales of action and resituates the situated 
body within a more inclusive and adequate research environment.
Notes
1 These influences splinter and are evident in the diverse works of poetry influenced 
by Wittgenstein, conceptual art of the 1960s and 1970s, and currently in the experiential 
art of installation and new media
2 Holt was also a student of James, and a teacher of the ecological psychologist James 
J. Gibson.
3 Gibson coined the term ‘affordance’ ‘to characterise the animal-referent description 
of objects and events (Warren and Shaw 11). Shaw was among many not satisfied with 
the exclusion of the perceiver in Gibson’s suggestion that affordances, as environmental 
information, were available to be perceived directly by all perceiving agents, not just humans. 
Affordances are different from physical properties because they are measured relationally, 
with respect to intentional acts (Warren & Shaw 11). Shaw’s notion of ‘effectivities’ (Turvey 
& Shaw, 1979) emphasises the perceiver-specific capabilities that activate the category of 
potential encounters that an affordance names (Warren & Shaw 12). Warren and Shaw remark 
that, ‘in sum, every disposition of an animal for some action co-implicates a disposition of 
some environmental structure to support that action’ (12). Robert E. Shaw and William 
Mace, prominent ecological psychologists, describe Gibson’s key notion of affordance as 
invariant environmental properties that provide specific causal informational support for a 
potential goal directed activity. To explain an agent’s interaction with invariant properties, they 
suggest that control-relevant task-constraints, or effectivities, must match the environmental 
affordances (Shaw & Mace 202).
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4 There is a trend in the arts which surfaced in the 1990s that argues the importance, 
for art practice and art theory, of the physiology of emotion and embodiment in relation to 
cultural processes. This was perhaps begun by Edelman’s essay for the Whitney Biennale in 
1995 and reiterated by Isabel Carlos, the curator of the Sydney Biennale 2004, through her 
interest in Damasio’s ideas on emotion (Fenner). The discourse on affect in the arts is focused 
on emotion, which alone is inadequate to address the physiological basis of change 
5 The visual cliff is a widely employed experimental structure which is used to test 
infants’ and animals’ depth perception and understanding of meaningful consequence by 
constructing a platform which has a clear pattern such as a chequerboard that leads to a 
vertical wall and then to a floor which has the same pattern. For safety, the cliff is covered 
with plexi-glass. The swinging room device was designed by David Lee and Roly Lishman 
in 1973 (Reed 58). It aims to discover a person’s awareness of encounters. The structure is a 
complete room and ceiling but without a floor, suspended above the actual floor on rollers 
or as a swing from a tall support. By blocking vision of the real floor the optical flow and 
perspective of the room can be manipulated and create a variety of event some of which 
are ‘impossible’. So for every move forward of a person in the room, the room moves twice 
that distance, giving the impression that the person is moving backwards or away from the 
wall they are walking towards. The experiment in part addresses questions as to whether the 
content of consciousness is quasi-linguistic or entirely ecological and specified by information 
(Reed 58)
6 Steve McCaffery (114) observes how the labyrinth is an architectural space where 
the categories of subject and object are made unsound and no replacements are offered. As 
a result, a person is never inside or outside of the labyrinth. 
Illustrations
Arakawa and Gins’ work reprinted with permission of the artists.
Figure 1. Architectural body of Arakawa and Gins. (Arakawa & Gins, Madeline. Reversible 
Destiny — Arakawa and Gins — We Have Decided Not to Die. Michael Govan, comp. New 
York: Guggenheim Museum Soho, 1997: 13.
Figure 2. Computer model of Bioscleave House, East Hampton LI, USA (begun in 1998) 
INTERFACES journal: Architecture Against Death/Architecture Contra la Mort. 21/22.1 (2003) 
Paris: College of Holy Cross and Paris Université 7 – Dennis Diderot: back cover.
Figure 3. Ames room reconstruction, http://psylux/psych.tu-dresden.de/il/kaw/
divers%20Material/www.illusionworks.co (accessed 28/03/05).
Figure 4. Ames room effect, photo by visual psychologist Richard Gregory, http://psylux/psych.
tu-dresden.de/il/kaw/divers%20Material/www.illusionworks.co (accessed 28/03/05).
Figure 5. Bioscleave House interior view of central room, CD-ROM of illustrations for essays 
in INTERFACES journal 2003.
Figure 6. Critical Resemblances House with multi-level labyrinth. Arakawa & Gins, Madeline. 
Reversible Destiny — Arakawa and Gins — We Have Decided Not to Die. Michael Govan, 
comp. New York: Guggenheim Museum Soho, 1997: 258.
References
Arakawa & Gins, Madeline. Reversible Destiny—Arakawa and Gins—We Have Decided 
Not to Die. Michael Govan, comp. New York: Guggenheim Museum Soho, 1997. 
456 Janus Head
 
  
—— Pour Ne Pas Mourir/To Not to Die. F. Rosso, trans. Paris: Editions de la Dif-
férence, 1987.
Backhaus, Gary. “The Fetters of Instincts and the Promise of Dymani Systems.” In 
The Cauldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-organisation — An Anthology. Ed. 
Ralph Ellis & Natika Newton. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000: 223–42.
Bennington, Geoffrey. Lyotard: Writing the Event. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988.
Crary, Jonathan. Suspension of Perception: Attention, Spectacle and Modern Culture. 
Cambridge: MIT, 1999.
Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. Mark Lester & Charles Stivale, trans. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990.
—— Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Daniel W. Smith, trans. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002. 
—— “He Stuttered.” In Gilles Deleuze and  the Theater of Philosophy. Eds. C. Boundas 
& D. Olkowski. New York & London: Routledge, 1994: 23–29.
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Felix. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Brian Massumi, trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
Ellis, Ralph. “Integrating Physiological and Phenomenological Dimensions of Affect 
and Motivation.” In The Cauldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organisation 
— An Anthology. Eds. R. Ellis & N. Newton. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000: 3–27.
Evans, Gareth. Varieties of reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Faw, William. “Consciousness, Motivation and Emotion: Biopsychological Reflections” 
In The Cauldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organisation — An Anthology. 
Eds. R. Ellis & N. Newton. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000: 55–90. 
Fenner, Felicity. “On Reason and Emotion: Isabel Carlos, Artistic Director of 2004 
Bienale of Sydney in Conversation with Felicity Fenner.” Art in Australia 41.4 (2004): 
554–56.
Foucault, Michel. “Las Meninas.” In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences. Alan Sheridan, trans. New York: Vintage, 1973.
Gendlin, Eugene. “The Mind/Body Problem and First-Person Process” In The Cauldron 
of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organisation — An Anthology. Eds. R. Ellis & N. 
Newton. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000: 109–19.
Gibson, James, J. “The Information Available in Pictures.” Leonardo 4 (1971): 
27–35.
Gins, Madeline & Arakawa. Architectural Body. Tusclaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 2002.
Gombrich, E.H. “Letters” (a response to James J. Gibson’s article “The Information 
Available in Pictures”), Leonardo 4 (1971): 195–203.
—— “Review of Reed, Edward’s James J. Gibson and the Psychology of Perception.” New 
York Review of Books. 19 Jan. 1989: 13–15.
Hatfield, Gary. “Attention in Early Scientific Psychology.” In Visual Attention. Ed. 
Richard Wright. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 3–25.
Heft, Harry. Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker and the Legacy 
of William James’ Radical Empiricism. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001.
Kawamoto, Hideo. “The Mystery of Nagi’s Royanji: Arakawa and Gins and Autopoi-
esis.” INTERFACES: Architecture Against Death/Architecture Contra Morte. Double issue. 
21/22.1 (2003): 85–102.
   
  
                                   Jondi Keane   457
Klein, Naomi. Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Frontlines of the Globalisation 
Debate. London: Routledge, 2002.
Knesl, Johannes. “Four Architects on Reversible Destiny.” In Arakawa & Gins, 
Madeline. Reversible Destiny — Arakawa and Gins — We Have Decided Not to Die. Michael 
Govan, comp. New York: Guggenheim Museum Soho, 1997: 215–21.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Repost on Knowledge. Geoffrey 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, trans. Theory and History of Literature Series 10. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
—— The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982–1985. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993.
McCaffery, Steve. “To Lose One’s Way (for Snails and Nomads: The Radical Labyrinths 
of Constant and Arakawa and Gins.” INTERFACES: Architecture Against Death/Architecture 
Contra Morte. Double issue, 21/22.1 (2003): 113–44.
Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin. “Inattentional Blindness: Perception without Attention.” 
In Visual Attention. Ed. R. Wright. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 55–76.
Massumi, Brian. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002.
Newton, Natika “Conscious Emotion in a Dynamic System: How I Can Know How 
I Feel”.  In The Cauldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organisation — An 
Anthology. Eds. R. Ellis & N. Newton. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000: 91-105.
Nicolescu, Basarab. “The Transdisciplinary Evolution of the University.” CIRET-
UNESCO Project from International Congress — Which University for Tomorrow? Monte 
Verita, Locarno, Switzerland, 1997. http://perso.club-internet.fr/nicol/ciret/bulletin/b12/
b12c8.htm.
O’Shaughnessy, Brian. Consciousness and the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
Reed, Edward. Encountering the World: Toward and Ecological Psychology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996.
Shaw, Robert E. & Mace, William. “A Précis of a Position to be Established in the 
Workshop on the Challenges and Promises of an Ecological Approach to Robotics”. In Studies 
in Perception and Action VII. Eds. S. Rogers & J. Effken. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2003: 201-206.
Turvey, Michael & Shaw, Robert E. “The Primacy of Perceiving: An Ecological Re-
formulation of Perception for Understanding Memory”. In Perspectives on Memory Research. 
Ed. L.G. Nilsson. Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum, 1979: 1-27.
Warren, William & Shaw, Robert E. (Eds.) Persistence and Change. Hillsdale NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1985.
Author’s note: Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jondi Keane 
at Griffith University. Email: j.keane@griffith.edu.au. 
